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Sri Lankan foreign minister Vijitha Herath signing a book of condolences following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Sri Lanka’s political establishment has been walking a tightrope this week, after the island was thrust into global headlines following the sinking of an Iranian warship off the southern coast of Galle by a United States submarine. For Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s regime, the incident has exposed the geopolitical balancing act that successive administrations have attempted to maintain for decades. Sri Lanka has cultivated close ties with both Iran and the United States. Both have supported the state militarily, economically and diplomatically, including with its brutal suppression of Eelam Tamils. With tensions between those powers escalating in the Indian Ocean, Colombo finds itself in a more precarious position than ever.
When news broke that the Iranian frigate had been struck, Sri Lanka’s navy swiftly mobilised a rescue operation. Whilst India, the regional power, remained largely silent in the immediate aftermath, Colombo appeared eager to demonstrate its role as the first responder. Dissanayake insisted that Sri Lanka was acting on “humanitarian” grounds. The operation saved the lives of dozens of Iranian troops.
Coming to Tehran’s aid would not be out of character for Colombo. Iran and Sri Lanka have maintained close relations for years. Economic ties particularly deepened during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa. Tehran reportedly supplied roughly $150 million worth of arms to Sri Lanka in 2005 alone, as the state intensified its military campaign against the Tamil people. In 2007, following the LTTE’s daring assault on the Anuradhapura airbase during Operation Ellalan, Colombo reportedly approached Iran for financial assistance to replace aircraft destroyed in the attack. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Sri Lanka in 2008, launching major infrastructure projects. His predecessor Ebrahim Raisi also visited in 2024, as Colombo continued to maintain strong economic links with Tehran, whilst attempting to avoid international sanctions.
It is no surprise then that across the Sri Lankan political spectrum there has been vocal support for Iran. From Muslim parties to Ranil Wickremesinghe, from the Rajapaksa family to Sri Lanka’s current foreign minister Vijitha Herath, leading figures have publicly expressed solidarity with Tehran and offered condolences following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Yet at the same time, Sri Lanka has sought to assuage Western fears.
Just weeks before the Iranian warship was struck, the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet visited Sri Lanka to discuss “security cooperation” with senior officials. That came on the back of years of Washington expanding its military engagement with Colombo through joint naval exercises and formally signing a defence cooperation agreement. The Sri Lankan navy itself operates several vessels gifted to it by the United States. During the final years of the armed conflict, Western powers provided diplomatic backing and intelligence cooperation to Sri Lanka even as the military carried out devastating offensives in the Tamil homeland. To this day, the United States remains a major financial and vital military partner.
For decades, Colombo has sought to maintain this dual alignment, with successive regimes attempting to play off competing global powers against each other to its benefit. The presence of a US submarine strike so close to Sri Lanka’s shores however has inevitably raised uncomfortable questions. Were Sri Lankan authorities aware that a foreign submarine was operating in the waters south of Galle? If not, how was the government left in the dark while another state carried out a deadly strike just 44 nautical miles from its coastline? And now that Dissanayake himself admitted that the Iranian vessel wanted to dock at Colombo before it was struck, why was there a delay in granting permission? With questions mounting over Colombo’s role in the incident and international attention now firmly fixed on the island, it is not clear how long this delicate balancing act can continue.
The crisis also raises questions from Tamils. Dissanayake has confirmed that a second Iranian vessel will be escorted to the naval base in Trincomalee. That harbour lies in the heart of the Tamil homeland, where the Sri Lankan military maintains one of its most significant bases. The president argued that docking the vessel in Colombo could disrupt commercial shipping. Yet the government did not choose the southern port of Galle, only miles from where the attack occurred. Instead, the vessel is being taken hundreds of miles around the island to Trincomalee. For the Tamil people, the decision once again underscores how their homeland continues to be used as a strategic military zone without consultation or consent.
Beyond the geopolitical fallout, Sri Lanka now faces serious economic risks. The conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran has already disrupted shipping routes and energy markets across the region. Sri Lanka also has hundreds of thousands of migrant workers there, contributing much needed foreign exchange. For an island that remains deeply dependent on remittances and imported fuel, the consequences could be severe. Sri Lanka’s economy is still struggling to recover from the devastating financial collapse of 2022. With households still struggling with inflation and austerity, shortages of fuel, gas and other essential commodities would be a disaster. A prolonged conflict could push Sri Lanka back toward the instability that erupted just four years ago, when economic crisis fuelled mass protests that toppled a president.
There are turbulent waters ahead.