As the long drawn out battle for Vakarai comes to a close, both the armed forces and the LTTE, as well as the entire nation, are wondering where the next battlefront will be opened.

For nearly six months, Vakarai, a tiny town that most Sri Lankans had never heard of before, held centrestage in the country’s civil war.

Sri Lankan troops examine a bridge to Vaharai blown up by the LTTE to slow the military advance. Photo SL Army

Now, with the armed forces finally taking control of the Vakarai area, the Army needs to plan its next strategy.

Although operations will continue in the Vakarai region to weed out the LTTE cadres remaining there, and to gain greater control of this border area between the Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Polonnaruwa districts, the Army should not squander its valuable resources there any more, but should move to the Northern Province and take the battle to the Tigers.

The Army’s top brass should be mindful that they are not diverted towards purely political targets, rather than areas that are more important militarily. The short history of Eelam War IV has unfortunately been driven by political objectives, rather than military ones.

The operation to re-take the Mavil Aru Anicut in mid 2006 was almost purely political. Almost no one had heard of this area before.

But when the leadership of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) made it a cause celebre by threatening to march there, the government ordered the Army to re-take it, which would stop the JHU from making political capital out of the situation.

The next operation, the capture of Sampur, was again mostly politically motivated in order to secure Muttur town and stop the Tigers from shelling Trincomalee.

After all, it was the Army itself that had watched idly as the Tigers set up new camps in the area during the ceasefire, and then gone to the extent of supporting the UNP government’s denial that such camps existed.

Even when media personnel who revealed the existence of these camps came under threat from the UNP regime, the Army’s top brass did not say a word.

The operation to re-capture the area was the unfortunate need of playing politics earlier during the UNP regime’s time in office.

The next operation, a disastrous attempt to retake the entire Jaffna Peninsula by attacking Muhamalai, was again politically motivated. The Army’s top brass simply wanted to hand the government a significant victory on the eve of the next round of peace talks. In the end, this failed.

So far, although both the armed forces and the LTTE have lost thousands of soldiers and cadres killed and wounded during the fighting over the last year, little of major strategic value has been gained or lost.

True, the LTTE has lost control of much of the East now. But this was expected no sooner its Eastern Commander, Col. Karuna, defected and threw his support behind the Army.

For the LTTE to have continued controlling Vakarai would not have been a major victory in strategic terms. It is neither here nor there. Vakarai is not Batticaloa or Trincomalee or Vavuniya or Mannar or Jaffna.

The same applies to the armed forces. Capturing Vakarai is not an end. Vakarai is not Kilinochchi, or Mullaittivu. To be sure it was a victory. But in the long history of Sri Lanka’s civil war, it is a minor victory. The major battles remain to be fought in the North.

Previously, few outside the Batticaloa district had been to Vakarai, which is a town on the rarely-travelled route between Batticaloa and Trincomalee.

Vakarai had been under government control until 1997, when the Army camp there was closed down in order that its troops could be shifted to the Northern Province, where the ill-fated Operation Jaya Sikurui was in progress.

Vakarai and a string of small camps had been protecting the earlier UNP government’s determined effort to control the East.

Many small camps, Vakarai among them, with thousands of soldiers manning them were closed down, as then Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte threw more and more troops into the futile attempt to force the roadway to Jaffna.

Ratwatte was willing to cede this area to the LTTE, since there are no major towns on this route.

When the troops vacated the area, the LTTE moved in with a small group of cadres and took control.

The road to Trincomalee continued to be used by civilians, including a bus service, with vehicles crossing through the Army’s checkpoint and then the LTTE’s checkpoint, and vice versa on the Muttur side after crossing the Mahaweli River at Verugal. Those who were traveling all the way to Trincomalee or Kantalai then continued on through the government-controlled area.

The road was closed down from time to time when there were clashes between LTTE cadres and troops. But for the most part it remained open.

This situation changed when the LTTE closed the Mavil Aru Anicut last May, forcing the government to launch an offensive to retake the anicut.

The crossing point was then closed since Vakarai became the southern front of the Mavil Aru battle. This worsened when the Tigers attacked Muttur, and the Army after forcing them out of Muttur town, continued on to capture Sampur.

Wherever the Army chooses to strike next, the choice must be made both carefully and swiftly. A wrong decision would doom the country to a long drawn conflict. A slow decision will allow the Tigers to regroup and re-arm. The decision is now.

Edited