Internal conflicts that have a deep structural asymmetry and powerful protagonists are less likely to reach a quick political settlement, due to their protracted and long-term nature.
It was the longest spell of negotiations between the Sri Lankan Government (GoSL) and the LTTE (hereinafter used as ‘both parties’). The lessons learnt from
Facilitation is the least forceful mechanism in ‘third-party mediation’. It essentially exchanges information between the conflicting parties to create a conducive environment for negotiations. In practice, however, this is a difficult task. Greater power disparity between the parties and increased militarism of the conflict often hamper successful third-party facilitation.
What were the drawbacks?
The CFA, entrenched as a tool for trust and cooperation, had been used mostly as a tool for argumentation. Even though there was a reduction of political killings in the early phase of the CFA, from the very start, the parties were unable to accept the other in good-faith. The Governments de-proscription of the LTTE was not perceived as a genuine goodwill gesture by the LTTE. Furthermore, the rejection of the LTTE’s ISGA proposal, and isolation from foreign funds became a huge concern for the Tigers. The increasing disagreements, mistrust and military antagonism made Norwegian efforts at confidence-building increasingly harder.
The Norwegian facilitation was not sufficient enough to ensure effective communication. The LTTE unilaterally withdrew from the sixth–round, symbolizing
In addition,
Meanwhile the parties continued to directly accuse each other of breaking the truce. According to cumulative statistics recorded by the SLMM, from February 2002-Auguest 2006 there were 276 violations by the GoSL and 4176 by the LTTE. Disarmament and disengagement had apparently further heightened asymmetry. In reality, both parties used military enhancement as a tool for bargaining during the talks.
The only ‘stick’ the Norwegians could offer, to encourage cooperation and engagement in refinement, was the SLMM and Donor contributions. But did the SLMM perform overall as a confidence-building tool? And were the Donors supportive in peacemaking? The fact is that the SLMM just kept for ‘monitoring’ and ‘reporting’ and kept urging the parties to adopt peaceful cooperation.
This was ineffective in eliminating the gross ceasefire violations, and continued military accumulations. Furthermore the SLMM had to verify facts with a limited staff, and faced technical difficulties. The SLMM having to function from staff from
Interestingly,
However, criticism over
Mostly, the arguments about
When looking at the six years of
The only enforcement that
Finally, it is important to note that recalling these lessons will impact future international third-party mediation to be productive in peacemaking efforts in
The writer holds a M.Phil. in Peace and Conflict Studies in the University of
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