The European Union resolution on May 18, the first step towards proscribing the Liberation Tigers, also marked the EU’s transition from observer to a partisan participant in Sri Lanka’s conflict. There are a number of controversial aspects to the resolution, including, for example, the directive to the LTTE to go for talks with the Sri Lankan government “without delay” and “be prepared to decommission weapons.”



But from a Tamil perspective, these need to be considered in the light of another controversial assertion in the resolution: that the EU does not recognise the LTTE as the “sole representative” of the Tamils. The resolution states that the EU “recognise that the LTTE does not represent all the Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka and calls on the LTTE to allow for political pluralisms and alternative democratic voices in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka which would secure the interest of all peoples and communities.”



Representational legitimacy is a much-debated and contested topic, one that has invoked considerable academic and lay discussion. But there are two related aspects of interest here – firstly, the impact of the EU statement on the ongoing internationally facilitated peace process, and secondly, whether the fact that this position has been expressed matters from a Tamil perspective.



To begin with, it can be argued that one of the key drivers for the LTTE to involve itself in the Norwegian facilitated peace process was the opportunity it provided to improve its image abroad. The Norwegian initiative paved the way for the international community to examine the legitimacy of the LTTE’s claim to be the sole representatives of the Tamils. Indeed, this was the basis on which the Norwegian initiative began in 2002, with the LTTE demanding Sri Lanka’s proscription be lifted as a pre-condition and that it be treated with parity during the peace process.



In short, the LTTE expected the internationally monitored ceasefire and associated peace process to enable the international community to engage with itself and the Tamils and to ascertain for itself the support the organisation enjoyed on the ground. It should be noted that the LTTE has always argued that its very existence and growth (argued to be predicated on the public’s willingness under conditions of war to supply both recruits and succour) is implicit evidence of broad-based support. In keeping with the expectations of the international community, there were two ways by which the LTTE could demonstrate the extent of its support base – through the ballot box and by its governance.



Though not willing to participate directly in the Sri Lankan political arena, not least given the LTTE’s rejection of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Buddhist constitution, the LTTE backed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition representing the four largest Tamil political parties, which in turn endorsed the LTTE as ‘sole representatives.’ It is notable that the TNA has been comprehensively successful at each election at which it has completed, sweeping not only the vast majority of the parliamentary polls in the Northeast, but also recently winning convincingly local government polls. Given that the TNA has always stood on a platform recognising the LTTE as sole representatives of the Tamils, its success at the polls can only be construed as political support for the Tigers amongst the Tamil population. In short, the Tamils voted for the LTTE by proxy.



There is an important point here. The LTTE was not demonstrating its support base to the Tamils – having defeated the indiscriminate onslaught of the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE had already achieved a near hegemonic position as the primary actor representing Tamil interests vis-à-vis the state. Therefore, the efforts at the ballot box were meant to underline to the international community the popular support the organization enjoyed.



While legitimacy, particularly political legitimacy, is most easily proven through the ballot box, it can be reflected in other ways too, including popular demonstrations of support and solidarity. Even before the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, the Tigers were able to mobilise mass rallies, both in the Army-controlled parts of the Northeast and across the Diaspora, expressing support for its leadership role. The mass attendances at the ‘Pongu Thamil’ rallies were meant – in time honoured tradition – as demonstrations of mass support for the LTTE. No other Tamil group, except the TULF before the armed struggle began, has come close to the numbers the pro-LTTE activists drew to the Pongu Thamil rallies.



Moreover, despite threats and violence by Sri Lankan security forces and, especially, paramilitaries, the Tamil media, both in Sri Lanka and amongst the Diaspora, have become more vociferous during the peace process in their vocal support for the LTTE. Whether the media shapes popular opinion, or reflect it, it cannot be denied that the majority of the mainstream Tamil media are firmly supportive of the LTTE as the representatives of the Tamil people. Those formerly coy on the question the legitimacy of the LTTE now sometimes question the movement’s policies, but not its right to speak on behalf of the Tamil people on the political question.



But with the EU ban coming at this historic juncture, the international community has effectively indicated that it neither wants to know nor cares as to whether the Tamils back the LTTE or not. In short, the EU has opted to declare itself what the Tamils ought to think. This has led many amongst the LTTE and the Tamils to question the point of the Norwegian peace process - of which the EU is a Co-Chair (along with Norway, Japan and the United States).



Amid the frustration over the EU’s single-minded decision, there is quiet support amongst Tamils for the understated firmness in the statement by the LTTE’s chief negotiator, Mr Anton Balasingham: “the more the international community alienates the LTTE, the more the LTTE will be compelled to tread a hardline individualist path.” Amid rising violence and brutality against Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan armed forces, some go further, querying why the LTTE still remains in a peace process that has now been proven to have delivered no benefits and is even devoid of a functioning ceasefire.



Some members of the international community have questioned the LTTE’s legitimacy on the grounds that it has been accused of killing Tamil opponents. But for the past decade, these opponents are less political rivals than paramilitaries fronting a counter-insurgency campaign for the Sri Lankan state. Even the US State Department this year finally admitted the EPDP, et al are paramilitaries engaged in violence against the LTTE. In an unavoidable parallel, even the leading Western democracies have all now implemented draconian restrictions as part of the ‘war on terror.’ The LTTE’s security environment and policing requirements are no less complex.



Others seeking to deny the LTTE’s legitimacy have done so on the grounds that the organisation is autocratic and therefore does not have the moral grounds on which to claim representative status. But this is to ignore the extensive administrative, judicial and legislative structures the LTTE has built up in areas under its control. The scale and nature of the decade-old civil administration, constituting a de facto state, in the LTTE controlled areas, are demonstrative of the organisation’s ability to meet the governing expectations of Western liberal norms. The point here is that the LTTE is not a political party – it is a de-facto state.



But all the objections above precipitate an unavoidable question: if the LTTE are not sole representatives of the Tamils, who else represents them? All the other Tamil actors putting themselves forward have been comprehensively defeated at successive elections (ever since the oppressive conditions of war were lifted, allowing the Tamils to express their electoral preferences). Almost all the non-TNA political parties are paramilitary groups operating in the Northeast with the Sri Lanka armed forces. If the press reports are true, some attempt has been made to unify these paramilitary groups under one banner, but even this has proven a failure, with no support forthcoming from the people. And no wonder - the only reason these groups have been given any prominence by the internatonal community is solely because of their opposition to the LTTE – it is not as if they have any alternative platform to offer the Tamils.



With regards the peace process, if the LTTE are not the sole representatives of the Tamil people, who else is to represent them at the table? Unsurprisingly, the EU certainly makes no attempt to answer that question. But in any case, on what basis is the EU attempting to tell the Tamil people that someone else (other than the organisation they electorally selected, not once, but thrice) should speak on their behalf? That the European Union has decided it won’t recognise the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils does not take away the mandate the Tamil people have given them.



The efforts of the European Union to deny the Tamil people their right to choose their own representatives and instead impose others on them will not lead to peace or even a peace process. Indeed all it will have achieved is to compel the LTTE to question the international community’s ability and willingness to resolve the real problems confronting the Tamils in Sri Lanka.



The matter has assumed critical importance as Sri Lanka slides inexorably towards the brink. The Tamil perspective was raised succinctly last week by an LTTE commander, speaking at the funeral of a colleague shot dead by Army snipers. “The whole world has had the opportunity to come here during the peace process, if they truly wanted to understand our situation,” noted Colonel Jeyam. “Can we expect those who failed to understand our political plight during the last four years of peaceful engagement to ever be able to understand it?”