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Can the UNF stand up to Kumaratunga?
Those who reacted nonchalantly to reports that the cohabitation between Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front (UNF) government is once again in crisis might be forgiven their sanguine response. After all, since coming to power eighteen months ago, the Premier has been regularly compelled to dance a soothing jig in the wake of Presidential tantrums over one triviality or another. But things seem a little different this time. The President's move to take control of the National Development Lottery Board from Economic Reforms Minister Milinda Moragoda seems a peculiar trigger for a constitutional crisis. But as Constitutional Affairs Minister Prof G. L. Peiris rather candidly pointed out, "the issue is not confined to the Development Lotteries Board. There will be far reaching constitutional implications." We agree.
Firstly, Kumaratunga's objectives are utterly transparent: destabilise the UNF's election-winning economic revival strategy, by disrupting donor confidence ahead of next month's conference in Japan to raise international assistance for Colombo's ambitious plans; undermine the UNF's political standing at home by humiliating its leadership; and thereby bring about conditions propitious for the dissolving of Parliament and calling of fresh polls - which Sri Lanka's opposition is increasingly confident of winning. Secondly, given these, Kumaratunga's timing is well chosen. With less than a month before the Tokyo conference, considerable donor attention is likely to be focussed on the UNF administration's policies and standing. Meanwhile, the pact between her People's Alliance (PA) and the Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) is reportedly close to being signed.
Both parties are eager to take on the UNF at the polls. Persistent economic hardship and doubt over the efficacy of the Norwegian peace initiative have tested the UNF's core election promise of 2001: prosperity through peace. Thirdly, and most importantly, the government is thus forced to accept her newest challenge - there is neither the time nor ready concessions with which to restore some semblance of cohabitation.
This newspaper - along with other voices, including those strongly supportive of the UNF administration, has repeatedly urged Wickremesinghe to impeach Kumaratunga or take steps to constrain her considerable powers. But the Premier has repeatedly wavered between confrontation and cohabitation, sometimes directly undermining the considerable efforts of his colleagues to mobilise public opinion to this end. We pointed out on each occasion that Kumaratunga's single-minded determination to remain in power well beyond her present tenure which ends in 2005, would pose a significant threat to both the UNF and thereby, the prospects for peace. From a Tamil perspective, the central concern must be, as ever, the impact the turmoil in Colombo will have on the struggling Norwegian peace process. Oslo's initiative is already facing endogenous problems: the Sri Lankan government's refusal to honour agreements already reached with the Liberation Tigers and international tolerance, even support, of this state of affairs has compelled the latter to suspend their participation in the talks 'for the time being.' The battle for political supremacy - actually survival - in Colombo will indeed have far reaching implications for efforts to resolve the island's protracted ethnic conflict. The PA-JVP axis is unashamedly hostile to the Norwegian initiative, to negotiations with the LTTE and to a deal with the Tamils - the President's dovish platitudes this week are duplicitous.
Kumaratunga has thrown down a gauntlet that Wickremesinghe is compelled to pick up. But he faces twin difficulties: if he attempts to placate her and fails, his weakness would be accentuated, damaging UNF standing in the public's perception; if he challenges her and fails, he could trigger elections that his government can no longer be certain of dominating. The UNF's defiance this week belies its evident doubts - which were underscored by the comical sight of a government forced to seal its printers so as to retain control of a relatively unimportant institution. The world, meanwhile, is watching. But Wickremesinghe's acumen and resolve are under scrutiny in the Tamil homeland too. If a solution to the Tamil question is to be reached, even if the ceasefire between Colombo and the LTTE is to last the distance, Wickremesinghe will need to take Kumaratunga on and prevail.
Why are local deminers short of funds?
Over two hundred people joined the Humanitarian De-mining Unit this week having completed their training, the organisation said. The new de-miners bring the HDU's strength up to 450. The news will be gratefully welcomed by the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced residents of towns and villages in the Vanni who remain
unable to resettle in their former homes due to the large numbers of mines and unexploded ordnance left over from Sri Lankan military occupation of these areas and the battles to resist it. Mine and UXO clearing is an agonisingly slow and dangerous task. The tools used are primitive - indeed, the vast quantities of shrapnel and assorted metal littering these areas can render sophisticated scanners unusable. Hand trowels, plastic rakes and raw courage must therefore do. The requirement to maintain the international standards to which demining is being carried out - methodologies and documentation that deminers from other parts of the world can recognise - also slows progress. The HDU points out - with justifiable pride - that its staff are clearing mines at a faster rate than their counterparts in other warzones around the world.
But the organisation is forced to struggle to expand its operations. The HDU's constraints are neither a lack of willing applicants or of sufficient work - millions of mines and unexploded projectiles litter the Tamil areas - but, incredulously, a shortage of sufficient funds. Whilst donors might expect international standards to be followed in activities they fund, there should also be both a requirement to transfer knowledge to more local staff and a necessity to do this quickly: the resettlement of civilians can only proceed at the rate of demining. Unfortunately, the
funding process is far from clear. International donations are provided
through Western demining organisations operating with the HDU - which is excluded from the process. The identity of the numerous donors, the size of their contributions and indeed, the fee structures for international experts is shrouded in unnecessary and hence suspicious secrecy. This is particularly pertinent in the context of the slow pace of overall progress and the HDU's strenuous efforts to expand its staff levels. The HDU itself, it is clear, receives a very small fraction of the funds: salaries are low, death benefits pathetic. Even the low-tech equipment HDU staff use is in shockingly short supply - the peace process and international involvement notwithstanding, the Sri Lanka military is still blocking much of the protective equipment that the deminers need, including the shrapnel - though not bullet - proof vests.
International training and advice is welcome, but it comes at a substantial, and in our view questionable, price. Whilst experts must be compensated for their efforts, the financial details must be transparent to the Tamil community and, above all, to the HDU.
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