OPINIONS

Cracks emerge but the colours are flying

Sri Lanka's government is pretending all is well with the deteriorating peace process, to avoid rattling international aid donors, writes Ravi Thurairajah

Evidence of President Chandrika Kumaratunga's increasing influence over the Norwegian peace initiative emerged this week following her meeting with the head of Oslo's facilitatory delegation, Mr. Vidar Helgesen, at which she emphatically ruled on the issues to be discussed at future peace talks in Thailand.

The President, who earlier this year seemed to have been successfully sidelined by Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, stamped her conditions on potential negotiations with little resistance from either the leader of the United National Front (UNF) government or the Norwegian delegation.

"The President during the discussion had stressed that all the core issues relating to the future of the Northeast province should be included in the agenda for Thailand peace talks," said a press release from the Presidential Secretariat referring to the meeting with Mr Helgesen on Monday. Mrs Kumaratunga also objected to the de-proscription of the LTTE prior to the commencement of peace talks, something else Mr Wickremesinghe's administration is leaning towards.

The fresh interference by the President has important ramifications which are apparent in the context of Sri Lanka's recent past. Mrs Kumaratunga's formerly ruling People's Alliance (PA) government had pursued hawkish policies on the ethnic conflict, making little movement towards a peaceful resolution. Propagating the rhetoric of a 'war for peace', the PA government employed a strategy intended to militarily destroy the Liberation Tigers instead.

Although the PA failed to gain the necessary success on the battlefield it however refrained from engaging in a ceasefire or de-proscribing the Liberation Tigers before talks. Kumaratunga's stance on the agenda for discussion was largely academic at the time, as talks without a ceasefire (as she demanded) were a non-starter. From a Tamil perspective the de-proscription of the Liberation Tigers was an essential pre-requisite to negotiations.
The UNF made substantial initial progress on the peace front compared to the PA. Wickremsinghe reciprocated the Liberation Tigers' truce and subsequently consolidated it with a permanent ceasefire agreement. The Prime Minister had won a strong mandate from the Sri Lankan public to end the war and appeared to be taking steps unthinkable from his hawkish political opponent - his bold strokes were endorsed by the electorate in the two subsequent local polls.

It is known that private agreements between the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, facilitated by the Norwegian government, had outlined guidelines and steps for the peace process. The UNF government accepted that the Tigers could not engage in talks unless normalcy first returned to Tamil areas. It further accepted the difficulties the Tigers faced if expected to negotiate while proscribed. The UNF government also shared the opinion that to attempt to address core issues at the outset would be detrimental to talks as neither side was ready at the early stages of a peace process to make the concessions necessary to ensure a successful conclusion to such an exercise. Instead, both parties agreed to establishing a sustained environment of peace and stability within which the protagonists could later redress their concerns and diffuse tensions.

Wickremesinghe's government therefore agreed privately to an interim administration for the Tamil north and east for a period of two or more years after which both sides could discuss a permanent solution to the island's ethnic problem. The talks in Bangkok this year were planned to address the formation of the interim administration.

Meanwhile, Kumaratunga vehemently opposed the ceasefire agreement with Liberation Tigers, but came under criticism domestically and internationally for her hawkish stance. The President subsequently mad-e dovish overtures, supportive of Norway's peace initiatives, however maintained her criticism over the direction of future talks. She insisted that the LTTE not be de-proscribed (an impasse-triggering policy which Wickremesinghe had initially rejected but recently appears to be curiously warming to) suggesting this week that, as a 'minimum,' a date for talks be set before de-proscription is considered. However, the establishment of a date for talks subsequently places the onus on the LTTE to adhere to the set date regardless of the failure by the Sri Lankan military to implement the ceasefire agreement, an escalating point of tension in the Tamil areas.

The President has also now insisted that the talks in Thailand should address a final solution to the ethnic conflict. But any agenda attempting to frame a final solution to the islands problems are bound to end in gridlock as neither side is prepared to make the necessary compromise at this juncture, particularly amid the still fresh enmity developed by decades of bloody war.

The failure by the UNF government to challenge the President over her disruptive moves and its conceding to some of her demands (such as that over de-proscription) suggests that the balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister has shifted decisively towards the former.

Upon assuming power, realising the threat Kumaratunga posed to his government and to a potential peace process - the viability of both being inextricably linked - Wickremesinghe embarked upon a twin strategy to curtail the President's powers. Both strategies progressed this week with the UNF saying it would present legislation to constitutionally curb Kumaratunga's powers while presenting further evidence to Parliament whi-ch could support potential impeachment proceedings in future.

Having laid in place elaborate measures to sideline the President, Wickremesinghe's failure to act decisively at this crucial juncture does not bode well. It is plausible that the statements in the press were merely a bluff and that the UNF does not have either the Parliamentary support or the legal case to curb the President's powers. Alternatively, Wickremesinghe may still harbours aspirations of forming a government of (Sinhala) national reconciliation - a move which would receive the strong endorsement of the ultra-nationalist Sinhala-Buddhist establishment.

The Buddhist leadership has been notably silent on the peace process to date - despite vehemently opposing far less conciliatory gestures to the Tamils in the past. This could be because one of Wickremesinghe's first steps on assuming power was to inform this notoriously hard line institution of his intentions and to assure them that he would not act against their interests. It should also be noted that the Buddhist clergy has eagerly advocated a government of national ( i.e. Sinhala) reconciliation with Kumaratunga's PA; arguing, quite rightly, that this would eliminating the dependence of Sinhala-dominated governments on minority (Tamil or Muslim) parties. As recently as last week the Prime Minister briefed the leaders of the main chapters of the Buddhist clergy on the progress of the Norwegian initiative, underlining the influence the prelates maintain over his actions.

To observers of the conflict, it should be increasingly clear that the Norwegian peace initiative is in an increasingly precarious state. The UNF government, which started off with a pragmatic approach to resolving the ethnic problem, is steadily adopting the hard line policies of its opposition (despite the drubbing the latter received in the last three polls). Wickremesinghe has chosen to either accept that he does not have the necessary clout to proceed with the peace initiatives whilst disregarding Kumaratunga; or has decided to enter a period of cohabitation with the President on her terms.

Key aspects of the ceasefire agreement and promises of de-proscription are being reneged on, jeopardising the entire process. Yet all the non-Tamil actors seem deliberately oblivious to this. This week the Norwegian government sent questionnaires to both parties on modalities for talks clearly assuming - or pretending - that negotiations will go ahead despite the major differences that are beginning to emerge.

Wickremsinghe also continues to profess that nothing is amiss, assuring the international community that he has contained Kumaratunga's bitter opposition to peace with the Tigers. However, it is clear that the peace process is foundering as Kumaratunga makes her political resurgence. The Prime Minister's pretence that everything is proceeding according to plan is most likely a charade for the benefit of the Sri Lanka Development Forum whom he will soon be courting in the hope of securing more desperately-needed aid. But is patently clear that all is not well in the island of Sri Lanka and any generous handouts made on the basis of assisting the peace talks are far from justified.

Is the Prime Minister’s will weakening?

In its editorial of May 14, the Uthayan newspaper questions Ranil Wickremesinghe's motives.

Has Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe heeded the chauvinist cries in the south against the peace efforts? Has he been persuaded by the racist forces?

The speech he gave a few days ago in Matara has raised this suspicion. "We will never accept parts of this country as traditional homelands. Sri Lanka is the homeland for all. We will not talk to the Tigers about another homeland," the Prime Minister said.

He displayed considerable resilience in pursuing a solution to the ethnic conflict during the last two general elections and after capturing power at the end of last year. Even after that he has stuck to the same line during the signing of the ceasefire accord with the Tigers, saying his only motive was to see an end to the ethnic strife.

But recently, the Prime Minister who played down the chauvinist chorus in the south against the peace effort has backed down to the extent to be appearing to trample underfoot the matter of something as basic as the Eelam Tamils' national identity.

Is this a ploy to move the peace effort forward? Or is it actually a result of him bowing to chauvinist demands? These are the questions now. Right or wrong, it is necessary that his government re-mains in power to advance the peace process and reach a final settlement. But a sword will continue to dangle above his government for as long as President Chandrika Kumarathunghe - who opposes it and its efforts towards peace - retains her executive powers.
Under the current constitution the president has the power to dissolve any government a year after its election. As long as the president has these powers it is questionable if the Ranil government can survive or move the peace process along a positive path.

President Chandrika will be able to use her power [to dissolve the government] in seven months time. There is no chance of reaching a permanent deal to end the ethnic problem by then.

Therefore, if Ranil is to make his plans for peace a reality, it becomes necessary for him to strip the President of her powers. For that he has to enact a change in the constitution in the parliament. He needs the support two-thirds the MPs to carry in through.

Ranil's ruling party will have to bring around at least twenty MPs from President Chandrika's opposition People's Alliance. She is trying to pin down her own MPs and with her chauvinist rhetoric to invite the support of racist parties such as the JVP.

Therefore, the Prime Minister has a need to take a harsher line on the ethnic question - in common with the chauvinists - to ease the President's grip on a number of her MPs and bring them around to his side. If his speech in Matara falls in this category then it is wise for the Tamil people to avoid making a big deal out of it and tolerating it.

However, the Tamils should not forget that the Prime Minister's assertion that "we will never accept parts of this country as traditional homelands" has been the reason for their homelands in the north and east being invaded by Sinhalese settlers and their land being seized.
If the Prime Minster's statement came from deep within his heart to endorse this planned act then he should not forget he will have to face the consequences.

The economic colonisations of the North

The Jaffna District NGO network questions the actual benefits to the region's residents of the redevelopment plans being touted by the government.

There is a saying that politics without economic freedom is politics without freedom. Eager investors and businesses are swarming in-to Jaffna under the pretext of developing the region. In fact, they are studying the ground conditions to exploit the situation. Some local business figures and senior government officials here are collaborating in this regard.

Colombo-based companies are trying to secure the market in Jaffna - with its half million population - that was shut to them for over ten years. People should carefully consider what the consequences of this development might be.

The earning potential of the people in Jaffna was affected severely by the Sri Lankan government's economic blockade that was in force from 1990 to 1995 (officially). Around half the population of Jaffna lived under the poverty line during that time. Those same people lived in an open-prison environment, with an effective yet unofficial economic blockade from 1996 until 2001. Seventy to eighty percent of the community struggled to acquire even basic necessities.

Although some restrictions have been lifted in 2002, no real improvement has yet been seen in the major sectors of employment and development; namely agriculture, fisheries and cottage industries. Ninety thousand families rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, while another fourteen thousand rely on fishing. Therefore, most people are in great difficulties. They have very little buying power. But what steps have Sri Lankan government officials taken to redress this situation?

The private sector can be divided in two: commercial enterprises and cottage industries. The cottage industry can then be further divided into production and construction. All these sectors have suffered greatly from the war. The development of these sectors should be fostered with meaningful plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction along with compensation for the losses suffered during the war.

The theatres of war used to have special restrictions and practices. It is essential that these areas now be classified as 'war affected' and given special grants and incentives for development. In-stead, the laughable notion of making entrepreneurs and businesses from the south in-vest here is being suggested.

The primary objective of an investor would be to see how much profit can be made and how much money can be extracted to Colombo. A method is hence forged for the limited finances of the people here to be removed to the south. Any shareholders from the north would have little financial muscle and so will remain shareholders only in name. The control will remain in the south for all practical purposes. Every one of us should realise the damage such an arrangement could cause in the future.

How many have come forward to build new factories and create new employment opportunities in this area? What support is given for initiatives taken locally? Figures indicate that banks here gave the south Rs 100 million of people's savings over the past twelve years. Only a fraction of that was given back to the people in the form of loans.

The non-governmental sector may be divided into three: foreign companies, national companies (centred around Colombo) and local companies

Whilst there was a shortage of resources from 1990 to 1995 as a result of the economic blockade, government and non-governmental organisations were involved in relief and rehabilitation work during this time, coordinated by us. The government placed strict controls on our activities from 1996 to 2001. All the while controls on foreign companies were gradually eased. Though controls on local organisations were eventually also relaxed, government officials employed various duplicitous strategies curtail their activities. The local organisations were hence pushed into financial difficulties and weakened.

In this difficult state, we faced up to the trials faced by our people, pressured the government and organised protests in many shapes and forms according to the needs at each instance. We challenged the illusions created by the government by highlighting major shortcomings in its relief and rehabilitation measures. We stopped the plan devised by government officials for a house-building scheme in Valigamam North that would have effectively given the region to the Sri Lanka armed forces.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction might take off on a major scale considering the ceasefire that is in force. Foreign money may be forthcoming. Having analysed this situation, some national companies have started taking a foothold here. What is the ulterior motive of those who never cared during the times when people here suffered and never did anything so much as express some sympathy, suddenly announcing they are going to help the humanitarian effort?
Jaffna is the ultimate market for making money right now. They think they can extract gold here and remove it to Colombo through clever commercialism.

It is the local civil servants who in the past applied a gloss to the plans for the development of Jaffna drawn up by the government. Though the government has changed, its machinery has not. Neither has the mentality of the civil servants. Even now they are trying to keep local companies and institutions out of the development work under the pretext that they are 'less able'. And through that they are not only letting Colombo-based companies secure work here but also extending considerable support to them. But local institutions will also blossom if given proper funding. People have not forgotten the work done [by them] prior to 1995 [when Jaffna was controlled by the Tamil Tigers].

When the ongoing activities are collectively analysed, it is becoming clear that a planned economic colonisation is underway in the north. We'll end up duped in the rush for peace if we do not resist this. We plead with the Tamil public to be vigilant on this matter.
(Translated from Tamil)