OPINIONS

Developing Jaffna alone is not enough

The development of Jaffna to the detriment of the rest of the Tamil homeland will prove a misguided attempt to divide and rule, argues Vino Kanapathipillai.

It has been just over two months since the indefinite ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lanka government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was signed. In that time, the Tamil people have begun to enjoy so-me of the benefits of peace. These include the easing of a severe economic embargo which deprived the people of the essentials of life and the slackening of restrictions of travel allowing for easier movement between areas controlled by the two parties to the agreement. However life for the people in the north and east can definitely not be classified as 'normal', as they will be the first to point out.

One interesting point to emerge in the months following the signing of the agreement is the approach taken, not only by the Sri Lanka government, but also by the international community to the redevelopment of the Tamil homelands as part of the process of rebuilding the war torn areas.

In the aftermath of the indefinite ceasefire agreement being signed, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe flew to Jaffna and met the US Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca in the peninsula. Subsequently, about 40 international diplomats, representatives of non-governmental organisations and businessmen flew to Palaly to view the destruction of the towns in the peninsula for themselves. This was followed by Colombo businessmen, who traveled to the north to analyse profitable opportunities in the aftermath of two decades of war.

The process of proving the war is over has not been limited to high profile visits, but has also included financial promises. The Asian Development Bank last week announced Rs40 million to the Jaffna peninsula to develop health, education, agriculture and water supply facilities in the war ravaged north. Earlier, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation revealed plans to assist the agricultural and fisheries industries in the peninsula to the tune of US$13.4 million.

As the financial and other assistance offered so far is tallied together, a clear picture emerges of a redevelopment programme that is being targeted at one (government controlled) part of the Tamil homelands to the detriment of all the other areas. In effect Jaffna is exclusively drawing the attention of the Sri Lanka government and the international community, leaving the Vanni and eastern areas to limp along as the poor relations.

While businessmen from Colombo seek to enter into exploitative agreements with their counterparts in Jaffna and gain the profits from a closed economy that has long been used to paying exorbitant prices for limited goods, there have been no such visits to investigate the Vanni. International diplomats have toured the peninsula, gawking at the sight of flattened Chavakachcheri town, but no foreign diplomat or aid worker has made the effort to visit the Vanni and view the suffering of the people there for themselves in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement.

Other, indirect assistance to the northern peninsula has also been put forward. The World Bank has offered the Sri Lanka government US$1.3 million in assistance to de-mine areas under its control. Other international organisations offering assistance include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which has made US$300,000 available and Mine Action Services which has provided a further US$38,000. The United States has sent a team of more than twenty to provide expert advice.

Sri Lanka's Country Researcher for the Land Mine Monitor, an Initiative of the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines Saliya Edirisinghe told the state owned Daily News that it costs around $1000 to deactivate a single landmine. While Edirisinghe estimates that there are 100,000 mine in the north, Yogan of the LTTE's de-mining section estimates that there are 1.4 million unexploded mines in the Vanni. Yet no international government or organisation has to date come forwards to offer assistance to those engaged in de-mining the much vaster tracts of land in the Vanni.

There has been a narrow perception that Jaffna is the capital of the Tamil homelands, especially residents of the peninsula - and those amongst the Diaspora hailing from the region. Even the international community has expressed this view, as evidenced for example by the reaction to the fall of Jaffna to government forces in 1995. Successive Sinhalese governments have used this impression to maintain the divide between the Tamils from Jaffna and those from the other parts of the island. This practice seems to continue with the current government -with the collusion of the international community.

However, given the current dispersion of Jaffna Tamils in the mainland and the fact that demographic maps have been redrawn as a result of the population movements caused by the war, to continue the policy of divide and rule in the current climate of resurgent Tamil nationalism carries the risk of alienating the majority of the local population. Even if the northern peninsula benefits, albeit temporarily, even the Tamils there feel that a thriving Jaffna alongside a woefully underdeveloped Vanni is the least desirable scenario.

Kumaratunga’s strategy for sabotage

President Chandrika Kumaratunga put in motion a strategy to pull the rug under the government's feet on the peace agenda last week, writes Suranimala in The Sunday Leader.

With the noose slowly but surely tightening around her over the actions of the Presidential security Division, President Chandrika Kumaratunga has now given the nod to launch an island-wide campaign against the peace process to her party, though publicly taking up a posture of supporting Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's peace efforts.

It is a culmination of the PSD problem and the government's intentions to introduce a constitutional amendment not only for a conscience vote but also to prune the powers of the president with regards to the powers of dissolution of parliament that have got Kumaratunga activated. The president now realises unless she ousts the United National Front (UNF) government in the short term she will be marginalised and has said as much to her Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) hierarchy.

The strategy worked out by the president therefore is to offer conditional support for Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's peace efforts and the constitutional amendments whilst activating the hardline Sinhala groups and the JVP to launch an all out offensive on the peace process, biding time till December before dissolving parliament.

It is with the same objective that the president undertook her mission to India where she impressed upon the Indian leaders and the media the importance of ensuring the proscription of the Liberation Tigers remaining in force, realising fully well, the talks between the government and the LTTE cannot get off the ground until such time that issue is resolved. That way the president hopes come December she will be in a position to dissolve, asking the people for a fresh mandate.

Thus prior to her visit to India, working through a hardline Sinhala group, efforts were made to get [Sri Lanka's powerful Buddhist clergy] the Maha Nayakes to address a letter to the president, prime minister leader of the opposition and all MPs calling upon them to protect the unitary state, resist any moves to de proscribe the LTTE, merge the north and east and setting up of an interim administration.

The idea was of course to put Prime Minister Wickremesinghe on the defensive and create the conditions for public agitation if and when the deproscription takes place. It was to be a win-win strategy based on the assumption war would break out, if the talks don't get off the ground due to the failure to deproscribe and if deproscription does take place to intensify the protest campaigns using the clergy as a spring board.

That way the radical groups believe the government will not be able to ensure stability for reviving the economy which in turn would lead to more frustration among the people, thus sowing the seeds for mayhem.

The desired objective of this exercise however could not be realised with the media questioning the veracity of some of the signatures resulting in the missive not getting the anticipated publicity leading to the JVP and the Sinhala hardliners launching a tirade against the media. To make matters worse the Asgiriya Mahanayake the following day publicly stated he supported the peace process.

But the president was undeterred and took with her a copy of the letter to India and it later came to be published in the Hindu newspaper, widely regarded as a pro Chandrika anti LTTE publication when it comes to issues concerning Sri Lanka.

However before leaving for India on Monday, the President convened a meeting of the SLFP Central Committee to discuss the current political developments with a view to evolving a strategy.

Prior to the meeting itself, the President, former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and opposition leader Mahinda Rajapakse met with the visiting Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minster Vidar Helgessen where once again the president said she would support the process but that deproscription should come only after the talks resume and progress is made.

It is after this that the Central Committee met to discuss plans to counter the UNF. Chief Minister of the Western Province Reginold Cooray struck a note of caution stating they were faced with a dangerous political situation and unless the SLFP took a clear stand on the peace process, the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) will capitalise on it and seize the party vote bank.

Former Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Vishwa Warnapala said the party must take a strong stand that ensures the rights of the Sinhalese are protected. Kegalle District MP, Athauda Seneviratne said the UNF government was planning to introduce constitutional amendments to take away the president's powers with a view to charging her in courts and deterrent action should be taken.

The President said the party should engage the UNP in dialogue with a view to buying time and that the SLFP should write to the prime minister and state the party position on the numerous issues based on which the SLFP will offer its support in a spirit of co-habitation. "We will say we will co operate subject to our concerns being addressed. That way we will engage them in dialogue and obtain time till we are ready," the president said.

Accordingly the committee did a draft wherein it was stated, there should be no de-proscription until such time the talks progress and that the SLFP is against the concept of traditional homelands and cannot agree to such demand by the LTTE being recognised on the basis, Sri Lanka belongs to all its people.

Since the proposal for an interim administration stems from LTTE's position that the government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is not stable [to offer a permanent solution], the SLFP would give the necessary strength to the UNF government to negate the necessity for an interim administration. Instead, the SLFP proposes in the draft that the government should go for a final solution without introducing an interim administration.

Of course the SLFP strategy on this occasion is to create a situation where it would be difficult for the Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to negotiate with the LTTE by queering the pitch early on, especially based on the very requests made by the LTTE with regard to de proscription and the Interim Administration.

In such a situation, having unleashed the extremist Sinhala groups led by the JVP to oppose the peace process, the SLFP is setting the stage to join the bandwagon as and when the campaign picks up by stating the UNP did not heed its proposals for co habitation, knowing fully well, if the premier concedes to Kumaratunga's demands, the peace talks will be a non starter.

It is clear from the SLFP strategy that there will be no co operation coming from the President and the SLFP in real terms At the same time, the strategy is based on the assumption the UNF cannot muster sufficient numbers without the open support of the main opposition to obtain the required 2/3rd majority to pass its constitutional amendments into law and take away the president's power to dissolve parliament.

Against that backdrop, having created sufficient waves in the country, the president having bought time by offering co habitation believes she will be in a position to dissolve parliament and go for elections anytime after December. At least that is the strategy.