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An elite believing in terror as their creed
Sri Lanka's elite Special Task Force bases its counter-insurgency campaigns on instilling fear amongst the residents in its areas of operations, writes Sutha Nadarajah. The latest arm of the Sri Lankan military to launch a renewed recruitment drive since the new United National Front (UNF) government came to power is the Special Task Force (STF), the innocuously named commando unit that whilst officially coming under the police service is, to all intents and purposes, soldiers specialising in counter-insurgency. The STF, which is said to number three thousand personnel at present, began conducting walk-in interviews this week in the south and the Sinhala-dominated Amparai district in the east.
The STF was formed in 1983, following the general escalation in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict in the wake of the anti-Tamil pogrom in July, in which thousands of Tamil were massacred as Colombo was ethnically cleansed by Sinhala mobs with the assistance of the Sinhala-dominated military. As youth flocked to join the fledgling Tamil guerrilla movements, the government of President Junius Jayawardene scrambled for international military assistance and training for its armed forces. However, at the time, Sri Lanka had few friends prepared to assist its campaign against the Tamils, particularly after the international coverage the pogrom had elicited. As such, whilst refusing to directly assist Colombo, the British government in 1984 approved the assistance of a private security firm, Keeni Meeni Services (KMS) whose staff comprised former Special Forces soldiers, mainly from Western militaries, including Britons, Rhodesians and South Africans. The creation of the STF was a personal achievement by Sri Lanka's National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, a Sinhala hardliner who was subsequently assassinated. The creation of the STF under police command structure as opposed to the Army's was probably influenced by British experiences in counter-insurgency, where operations by such units could be classified as 'law enforcement' as opposed to 'military' activities and hence attract less international interest or give undue validity to the guerrillas as 'combatants.' Indeed, the significant British influence is clearly visible to this day: the STF's uniform still uses the DPM camouflage of the British army. Setting itself apart from the other Sri Lankan military forces, the STF selected its recruits. But indiscipline and brutality quickly became a hallmark of the unit, with summary execution of civilians and torture commonplace. The unit, whose success relies on terrorising the local population into avoiding the guerrillas, as opposed to the 'hearts-and-minds' approach oft recommended by counter-insurgency specialists, has been accused of abuses throughout its eighteen year existence.
The influence of the South African mercenaries expanded when Sri Lanka established close links with the Apartheid regime's military. The supply of mine-resistant, fast cross-country Buffel armoured personal carriers - a hallmark to this day of the STF - was a key development. The South Africans themselves had a similar force to the STF, titled Koevet (Afrikaans for crowbar) conducting counter-insurgency operations in Namibia, where Buffels proved invaluable against guerrillas operating on foot in the vast expanses. Another South African tactic passed onto the STF was the use of dogs to track enemy personnel. Just as instilling fear, as opposed to hearts and minds, was the preferred strategy against black insurgents in Namibia, the STF set about terrorising residents in areas it was deployed in.
Summary executions and disappearances became common features of STF operations, for example. In 1996, Amnesty International singled out the unit for disappearances in the Amparai area, predominantly of young Tamil men. In 1996 and 1999, the unit was again highlighted for widespread use of torture. In some cases extra-judicial killings were angry reprisals against civilians for Tamil Tiger attacks in which members of the security forces were killed or injured.
"Several [extrajudicial killings] occurred during cordon and search operations by the STF," Amnesty noted, adding "In many cases, the security forces claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE. However, human rights monitors determined that these victims were civilians." The United States State Department on Sri Lanka also singled out the STF for extra judicial retaliatory killings, noting "Several such reprisals occurred during operations by the STF." Rapes of Tamil women by STF commandos were not infrequent, particularly women either working in the Batticaloa district fields or moving between the villages there, although civilians try to avoid venturing into areas where STF personnel are on patrol given the unit's propensity for violence against civilians. Though the complaints against the unit and pressure from human rights groups have resulted in the occasional arrest, there have been no convictions. Amnesty said that 22 STF soldiers arrested in connection with the killings in September 1995 of 21 young men in custody at the STF headquarters in Colombo and released on bail three months later had returned to active duty. Sinhala ethos The Sinhala supremacist ethos that underpins Sri Lanka's armed forces is particularly strong in the STF. Members are said to be committed to the maintaining the unity of the Sri Lankan state, based on the ideal that the island was a gift to the Sinhalese from Buddha himself. For those entering the gates of the STF School in Katukurundha, the sign board with Sinhala lettering 'Niyatha Jaya' (meaning certain victory) greet visitors, who also pass a statue of a soldier with the words "Follow me- Train with the best" inscribed on its base. The STF course comprises a tough and vigorous training program of 14 weeks initially, before being sent into the thick jungles of Panama and Potuvil area for one week of intensive testing, according to Sri Lankan press reports. Predominantly male, the STF has some female soldiers in its ranks now.
Mixed results Despite the STF's advanced training, it has had mixed results against the LTTE's eastern units, its successes often being based on wholesale expulsion of Tamil civilians from a region - often as a prelude to Sinhala colonisation. When the LTTE, having been forced out of the northern city of Jaffna, moved significant numbers of battle-experienced cadres into the Batticaloa district in 1996, the STF became a key target. Patrols were repeatedly ambushed and several platoons were drawn into elaborate firefights, resulting in heavy casualties. According to press and human rights agency reports, people in Batticaloa were used for forced manual labour, as human shields, even as live mine detectors. Amnesty cited an example where STF troopers reacting to an LTTE attack on a military camp commandeered a civilian bus - and drove into battle with the passengers still on board resulting in many casualties. Although the Norwegian peace initiative has been revived, the extensive recruitment being undertaken by Sri Lanka's armed forces underlies the preparations for war. With UNP governments viewing the eastern province as strategically more important than the north, the pacification of the Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts will be a priority for the present administration in any future conflict. Of the Sri Lankan armed forces, the STF is the unit best suited for this role. As such were the fighting to recommence in future, the STF is expected to spearhead the government campaign - and with the convictions for rights abuses in past being unlikely - human rights violations can also be expected to resume on a significant scale again. Terror laws snare SLA assassins When Sri Lankan police swooped on a squad of young soldiers with weapons, mines and LTTE uniforms, the Army protested the exposure of a covert operations unit, but investigators say they thwarted a plot against the Prime Minister, reports TamilNet. The arrest last week of members of an elite commando unit of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) on suspicion they were planning to assassinate the Prime Minister has blown the cover of an important covert operation to assassinate senior members of the Liberation Tigers, the Sunday Time reported this week. The arrests of members of a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) group came despite efforts by the SLA high command to prevent the raid on the soldiers' safe house, the paper said.
The Liberation Tigers' political leader, Mr. S.P Thamil Chelvan was the target of two failed assassination attempts by SLA deep penetration teams, one of which was while he was en route to meet a Norwegian peace delegation for talks. The deep penetration teams are also accused of the murder and abduction of Tamil civilians in LTTE controlled areas. On 22 May 2001, four civilians were shot dead by a SLA deep penetration team north of Batticaloa. On 2 April 2001 five civilians were abducted by a SLA deep penetration team in the same area. Later on 25 April nine civilians, including three women who were farming activities were also abducted in
Kaaverikulam. In May last year, one civilian was killed and three were reported missing in an attack by a Sri Lanka army Deep Penetration team near Mathurankerni Kulam. The Sunday Times newspaper said the LRRP teams work with ex-LTTE cadres. In the past, some of these cadres have turned out to be infiltrators. A trooper of a Sri Lanka army deep penetration group was killed by another member of the unit in August last year, who then escaped into LTTE held territory. Three senior operatives of the unit conducting deep penetration raids in the Batticaloa district were killed in a suicide bomb attack in the heart of Batticaloa town on 15 November.
The Lanka Academic online newspaper reported that morale in SLA had been hit hard by the arrests. "The morale of the army is very low after this incident. It is sad the way these people are treated and it is definitely a victory for the LTTE," the Lanka Academic quoted on one officer as saying. "Why are the people keeping quiet when we are treated like this?" asked another. "The situation should have been handled in a more matured manner," a high-ranking
Army source told the Lanka Academic. The Sunday Times' respected defence columnist, Iqbal Athas, echoed the SLA's sentiment. "All of them [LRRP troopers] are in one room and have to tolerate the ignominy of a stinking toilet whilst they answer questions from their interrogators," he protested. |