EDITORIAL

Host Country

India is best placed to provide a venue for talks

The Norwegian initiative is decidedly moving forward. Following a successful meeting on Friday with the Liberation Tigers' chief negotiator and political advisor, Mr Anton Balasingham, a Norwegian delegation is expected to visit Sri Lanka this week. The signs -accurate or otherwise - of hectic diplomatic activity with regards to Oslo's peace initiative continue to raise hopes amongst Sri Lanka's peoples. Mistrust and caution - quite rightly - remain palpable, however. As we pointed out last week in the wake of the threats of renewed war unwisely articulated by Sri Lanka's new Defence Minister, every comment by any of the parties concerned has an impact, often significantly.

Tilak Marapana's ill-timed belligerence and the hysterical protests of the Sinhala far right aside, a cumulative sense of slowly easing tensions is emerging in Sri Lanka. Little wonder then that speculation has already begun over the timing and venues of future peace talks. Norway, as the official facilitator, will no doubt be actively considering these matters already. Whilst it is far too early to plan the timing of talks - there are many bridges that need to be passed first, not least the matter of de-proscription of the LTTE, an essential pre-requisite for meaningful negotiations - it is not unreasonable to think about suitable venue. Arranging this will - in itself - be a prerequisite for setting a timetable for talks.

The Norwegian delegation, this paper learns, will be putting to the Sri Lankan government a suggestion from the Liberation Tigers that India could provide a such a venue. Whilst clearly Colombo needs to share the LTTE's sentiments on the matter - and India must also be comfortable with the notion (the former also being a precondition for the latter) - the reasons for holding negotiations at a location in south India are compelling. To begin with, Colombo is out of the question. With Sri Lanka's Prime Minister himself at risk from rogue elements with the Sri Lankan military - as events last week proved - and President Chandrika Kumaratunga, a committed opponent of negotiations with the LTTE, in charge of the armed forces, southern Sri Lanka is absolutely unsuitable. Other locations which could offer both negotiating teams rapid and easy physical access to their respective leaderships in Colombo and the Vanni are decidedly few. Another key factor is the availability of suitable facilities to cater for the health and safety of the negotiators.

Mr. Balasingham, the LTTE's chief negotiator, is known to have a renal condition, requiring frequent medical checks and access to specialist equipment for treatment.
The United National Front (UNF) government of Ranil Wickremesinghe has welcomed - indeed aggressively sought - greater involvement by India in the island's peace efforts. Whilst Delhi diplomatically declined to infringe on Oslo's prerogative, reinforcing its support for Norway's long-standing and continuing efforts, the notion of holding talks in Indian territory should not prove problematic to Colombo. Of course, the Sinhala far-right, led by the Marxist and vehemently anti-Indian Janatha Vimukthi Permana (JVP) will shriek in protest. But they are, in any case, not supportive of the notion of peace with the Tamils and need to be resolutely marginalized.

From Norway's perspective, Oslo has always been cognisant of regional realities, keeping Delhi informed every step of the way - with the support of both the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government. Clearly Norway would like to play a prominent role in opening any negotiations but would appreciate India's assistance with their longer term conduct.

From India's perspective, the hosting of such talks should be a relatively uncomplicated matter. As the regional power, India justifiably has vested interests in both securing a speedy negotiated outcome to Sri Lanka's conflict and in the nature of the settlement itself. Whilst India's involvement in the island's matters in the past proved controversial and ended unhappily for all concerned, the provision of a venue for talks in the context of the Norwegian peace initiative would be significant contribution to the latter's success - something Delhi has consistently stressed its support for. A point of opposition that could be raised domestically is of course India's proscription of the LTTE. But that is based on as yet unresolved matters not related to the Sri Lankan conflict. The island's war, by the same token has considerable impact on India's regional economic, geopolitical and - hence - security concerns. Hence, while it remains to be seen as to when and where negotiations between the two sides will commence and continue, regional authority, geographical proximity and vested interests provide compelling reasons for the necessity of India's assistance in this regard.

First Step

The easing of the blockade is a welcome start

Amid the continuing unilateral ceasefires being separately observed by the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan armed forces, the necessity for a permanent ceasefire remains obvious. Already there have been incidents that had the potential to escalate into violence.

As such, the Norwegian delegation expected to visit Sri Lanka this week will, this paper learns, be taking with them specific proposals by the LTTE to lock down the present tranquillity prevailing in the war zones and establish mechanisms for associated matters like movement of unarmed personnel, resolution of breaches, etc.

Combatants on the respective frontlines need to have a mutual understanding and acceptance of what is and is not permitted under the terms of the ceasefire. As an aside, it should be borne in mind that a permanent ceasefire does not mean a total cessation of military-related activities - the massive recruitment drive being undertaken by all services of the Sri Lankan security forces this month is a case in point. The de-escalation process has begun, but is arguably yet to get into its stride. As we have pointed out before, continuing cordon and search operations by the Sri Lanka Army not only have the potential to trigger serious confrontations with the LTTE, they are weakening confidence in Tamil areas in Colombo's commitment to the peace initiative, as do arbitrary arrests in Colombo.

Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan government's strict economic embargo in the north and east still holds. Hospitals are still without desperately needed drugs, food is in short supply, ordinary life remains a struggle. Last week, the new United National Front (UNF) government declared its intent to ease the embargo and allow the flow of essential items from the middle of January. This is a welcome step, a significant departure from the uncompromisingly hostile position of the People's Alliance (PA) regime that has for several years inflicted enormous suffering on our people. However, contrary to the perception delivered by the public relations blitz that accompanied the announcement in Colombo last Wednesday, the matter is certainly not concluded.

Firstly, as those familiar with the abortive peace process of 1995 will recall, it is not the promises in Colombo that will ensure the desired alleviation of suffering in the Vanni, but the physical delivery of essential supplies to the people there. The Sri Lanka Army proved then a law unto itself, blocking supplies at Vavuniya and thwarting the alleviation of the difficulties of civilians in the menacingly titled 'uncleared' areas. That potential for disruption remains. Secondly, several vital items remain blocked or subject to strict rationing (however commonsense dictates that military items will of course remain barred). The process by which these matters will be resolved so that residents of the Vanni achieve the same level of day-to-day ease as that enjoyed by the Sinhala people in the south, will regrettably take considerable time.

The Tamil homelands have been devastated by the heavy weaponry deployed by the Sri Lankan military. Roads have been shattered, houses, schools and hospitals reduced to rubble. Vehicles have been destroyed or immobilised by attack and blockade on spare parts. Together, these factors will hamper the distribution of essential supplies. The authorisation by the UNF of the reparations of the road infrastructure is therefore another welcome step. The overarching concern with regards to the embargo, is the ensuring that the ethnic discrimination inherent in Sri Lanka's blockade must end in a practical, real sense. Comments last weekend by Dr. Jayalath Jayawardene, Sri Lanka's Minister for Rehabilitation and Resettlement that "Tamils in the so-called uncleared areas are Sri Lankans too," hopefully reflects his government's recognition of the dynamics of this issue.