FEATURES

2001: Mixed fortunes, new confidence and fresh optimism

2001 brought mixed fortunes for the Tamil community. The year began with justifiable pessimism as the Norwegian peace initiative frayed under repeated Sri Lankan military attacks - despite the Liberation Tigers' unilateral ceasefire announced Christmas Eve 2000 - and concluded with renewed optimism as a new seasonal truce by the LTTE was reciprocated by a new government in Colombo. While Norway's peace efforts alternatively progressed and struggled in the year's first few months - before ultimately stalling through Colombo's vindictive dismissal of Oslo's Special Envoy - the Sri Lankan military suffered a crushing defeat in an unwarranted military adventure prepared under the cover of the LTTE's one-sided ceasefire.

Harassing raids against Tamil villages by Sri Lanka's air force invited a surgical counter-strike in Colombo that triggered a devastating economic chain reaction and brought the country to its knees. Life continued to be difficult for hundreds of thousands of people as Sri Lanka tightened its draconian economic embargo on areas its military writ could not run - while human rights were routinely violated in areas it did.

The international community became more involved in the Sri Lankan conflict, pressurising the government to negotiate - even while paradoxically assisting its war efforts - and at the same time condemning the Tamil freedom struggle as extremism. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11 radically poisoned world governments' sentiments towards all armed non-state actors and thereby denied freedom movements all over the world their due political space in international affairs - and gave new legitimacy to violent repression by tyrannical governments. On the other hand, the Tamil national project grew at home and abroad on a massive scale and in unexpected ways as Tamil civil society and polity rallied unambiguously behind the cause of self-determination for the Tamil people - and the Liberation Tigers' armed struggle. Unparalleled Tamil unity in the north and east however coincided with sudden disarray in the Sinhala south as President Chandrika Kumaratunga's hawkish People's Alliance government collapsed under the combined pressure of the more dovish Sinhala opposition assisted by all the island's minority parties.

Mass movement

The most significant change in Tamil affairs began innocuously enough. Tamil university students in Jaffna - a new and unlikely hotbed of Tamil nationalism - began organising street protests calling on the government to reciprocate the LTTE's unilateral ceasefire and negotiate with the movement. The demonstrations erupted into a mass protest movement that repeatedly brought the Tamil homeland to a halt while the community, with one voice, demanded their right to self determination and endorsed the Tamil Tigers as their sole representatives. The "philosophy of compromise and submission" advocated by the international community was emphatically rejected. The 'Pongu Thamil' (Tamil Upsurge) campaign, which spread to every population centre in the north and east, as well as Diaspora concentration in the West, was studiously ignored by the world powers and the Sinhala polity. However the roar from the north and east filled the Tamil struggle's sails with a fresh wind. The main Tamil parties - in a hitherto unthinkable move, despite the common sentiments they began expressing the year before - formally united behind the Tamil aspirations articulated in protest signs and posters across the north and east. Banned in Sri Lanka and in several key countries - whose governments nevertheless insist they want a just peace to prevail in the island - the Liberation Tigers were endorsed by the Tamils as their sole representatives. Little wonder then that the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) swept the Tamil areas in the Parliamentary polls on December 5, despite almost 140,000 people being blocked by the Sri Lankan military from access to their polling booths.

On the other hand, if there was any lingering doubt that Sri Lanka's Sinhala dominated and corrupt political system would deny the Tamils their most basic political aspirations, the December 5 polls dispelled these. Even though they secured an unprecedented sixteen seats in Parliament together, the Tamil parties remain a peripheral force in Sri Lankan politics, with the first and simplest test of their influence in Colombo failing as the new United National Front (UNF) government - despite explicit pre-election promises to the contrary - refused to disarm the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), a Tamil paramilitary group that whilst being a key Parliamentary ally of the former ruling People's Alliance (PA), had carried out a vicious and brutal campaign of intimidation against the other (pro-UNF) Tamil parties.

International condemnation

Despite the mass protests in support of the LTTE and Tamil self-determination, the international community maintained its bias towards the state in Colombo. Sentiments regarding Britain's proscription of the Liberation Tigers were split precisely along the island's ethnic boundaries. When Tamil pleas ultimately failed to stay London's ban on the LTTE, long-standing assumptions about Britain's approach to the Tamil question were bluntly dispelled. If the Tamil community failed to grasp the thrust of that harsh lesson in realpolitik, it was reiterated when the United States Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Ashley Wills, gave a speech in Jaffna town in April denigrating the Tamil people's demand for the right to self-determination as ethnic purism and unjustifiable self-indulgence. The condemnations of the Tamil in the international arena were probably intended to persuade the Tamil people to limit their protests to what the Sri Lankan political system would permit. Rather curiously, however, the ineffectiveness of the Tamil political parties in Colombo was repeatedly underlined by the international community itself. As a delegation from a dozen Tamil parties and groups traipsed from embassy to high commission in Colombo with pleas to get Sri Lanka to reciprocate the LTTE's ceasefire and enter negotiations, they were politely sent off with a cheery wave and comical assurances their messages would be communicated. In the meantime, weapons poured into Colombo, paid for by international funding. The Tamil delegation's repeated humiliations in Colombo translated into longer lines at LTTE recruiting centres in the north and east.

The war continues

Norwegian efforts notwithstanding, the conflict in Sri Lanka continued through the year. The last of the LTTE's unilateral month-long ceasefires was rejected by Colombo and expired in late April, a day before the Sri Lanka Army launched a massive ground assault to recapture its former prize base at Elephant Pass. Prepared in secret during the early months of the year, Operation Agni Khiela (Rod of Fire) was staged despite an explicit assurance to Norway - later reissued to the LTTE by Oslo - by President Kumaratunga that there would be no Sri Lankan offensive to disrupt the process. Agni Khiela was an unmitigated disaster. The SLA's fighting divisions suffered a shattering 2,500 killed and wounded. The SLA is yet to return to an offensive posture.

The SLA's repeated efforts to recruit amongst the Sinhala youth failed to attract the necessary applicants. On the other hand, Sri Lankan press reports throughout the year claimed the LTTE was conducting an extensive recruitment campaign, drawing volunteers from both the territory it controls and the Tamil population centres held by the SLA. The Colombo press also claimed the Tigers brought in several shipments of weapons throughout the year. The further shift in the balance of forces was particularly visible at sea, as the Sea Tigers, unfettered by the LTTE's self-imposed ceasefire, stepped up operations, destroying numerous Sri Lankan gunboats and hitting supply convoys destined for the SLA garrison in Jaffna. The SLA repeatedly tried to assassinate members of the LTTE leadership, killing some junior officers and one senior commander, Colonel Shankar. The attacks weakened the Norwegian peace initiative further. The acquisition of rockets with chemical warheads by the Sri Lanka Army was a key escalation of the conflict. A thousand RPO-A Shmel rockets were bought from a Russian manufacture via a UK supplier.

Economy in ruins

The most significant military engagement came in late July -preceded weeks earlier by an explicit warning from the LTTE. The Sri Lanka Air Force's repeated attacks on Tamil villages in the Vanni and the eastern province escalated after Agni Khiela's failure. The LTTE struck back on July 24. Fifteen commandos infiltrated the SLAF base at Katunayake near Colombo and destroyed and damaged several jet bombers and helicopter gunships. They also crossed the runway and attacked several airliners of the national carrier parked on the apron of the island's sole international airport. Four were destroyed and two badly damaged. Although no tourists were killed in the fighting, which was broadcast around the world, the fallout of the Katunyake attack, coming amidst a weakened economy and looming world recession was staggering. The tourist industry collapsed. Panic among global insurers triggered war surcharges on air and sea shipments to and from the island crushing exports. The raid was condemned by international governments but, as the number of airstrikes plummeted, celebrated amongst the Tamils.

Embargo remains

Conditions in the Tamil areas not under the control of the Sri Lanka military continued to be difficult. The government's maintained its strict economic embargo on the Vanni and parts of the eastern province. Hospitals struggled without drugs or basic equipment, education occurred in fits and starts under trees or in shattered buildings. Epidemics occurred amid widespread malnutrition. International aid agencies, meanwhile, maintained a respectful silence for fear of offending Colombo. The ban on fishing proved crippling to tens of thousands of people. Tamils struggled to move around the island, penned in holding camps and subjected to frequent search and often detention. Tamils living under army control suffered torture, rape, assault and disappearances amid continuous cordon and search operations. Once incident had a profound impact on the global Tamil community. The gang rape in March of two Tamil women, Sivamani Weerakon and Nanthakumar Wijikala, by several sailors and troops, whilst others watched in amusement, triggered revulsion and rage across the north and east and amongst the Diaspora, adding an unforeseen impetus to the Pongu Thamil campaign for self-rule - and no doubt having an impact on the LTTE's recruitment. Subsequent rapes in Colombo and Jaffna further inflamed sentiment.

Norway stymied

Under these harrowing conditions in the north and east, the Norwegian peace initiative struggled to make headway as President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar sought ways to mire the process in bureaucratic detail. Sri Lanka's economic embargo on the Tamil areas proved - just as in 1995 - to be a stumbling block to de-escalating the conflict. Norway ostensibly unilaterally came up with a Memorandum of Understanding under which the embargo would be lifted if the LTTE halted attacks in the south. The Tigers accepted the MOU, but Sri Lanka simply rewrote it. Oslo failed to defend its initial draft and the idea failed. In any case, the whole Norwegian initiative ground to a halt when Colombo grumbled to Oslo about the scrupulous neutrality of Special Envoy Erik Solheim. Norway imprudently agreed to down-grade Solheim and the outraged LTTE demanded a return to the status quo before the initiative proceeded further. The matter remained in limbo as Sri Lanka went into a political tailspin and President Kumaratunga forgot about Norway and peace and fought to save her collapsing government from a determined opposition campaign.

PA collapse

After seven years in office, disillusionment with Kumaratunga's ruling People's Alliance (PA) had become widespread, the true extent of which had been concealed through massive rigging and malpractice in the elections of the late nineties. Kumaratunga's increasingly autocratic governance sowed discontent within the government's ranks. Her coalition allies from the estates had become openly critical in March amid protests in the tea country. But it was her humiliating dismissal in early June of cabinet minister Rauf Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) that triggered the party's defection to the opposition benches and reduced the PA to a minority. The disagreement had been triggered by riots against the Muslims of Manawella by local PA-led Sinhala mobs. As an aside, the riots also spawned the 'Manawella worm' internet virus which informed the networked world, albeit rudely, about the Sinhala violence.

The emboldened main opposition United National Party (UNP) made fresh and determined efforts to unseat the government and trigger fresh elections. With the government facing a humiliating defeat on the monthly vote for the Emerge-ncy Regulations, Kumaratunga took matters into her own hands passing new the requisite orders via Presidential Directives.

However, the impeachment motion against her proved a far more clear and present danger and Kumaratunga promptly prorogued Parliament. The outraged opposition launched a mass protest campaign - Kumaratunga also banned demonstrations - that was met with violence from the state security forces. Kumaratunga also threatened to "seek the people's verdict" through a referendum, which was scheduled for late October. Though the folly of such a move, had it been followed through, only became apparent in the December polls in which her party was comprehensively beaten, the matter became a focus of opposition resistance.

Kumaratunga in the meantime struggled to find Parliamentary allies - even lobbying the UNP - and finally the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) stepped up. A deal was struck, the referendum abandoned and Parliament reconvened. However, the Marxists extracted a fearsome toll for their support which the hapless President meekly paid. The slashing of her cabinet in half was one JVP demand. The disgruntlement in her party escalated and rebels streamed to the UNP. The PA-JVP deal collapsed and the December polls were scheduled.

Apart from the PA's rout and the UNP's return to power - in a coalition with the SLMC and the plantation parties, the JVP showed a massive rise in its support, securing 16 seats.

World changes

Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11 killed thousands of people and changed the dynamics of world affairs. An outraged United States drew a coalition of countries together and launched a massive military campaign to find and destroy the al-Qaeda organisation which had carried out the attacks. As part of its mobilisation against "international terrorism," the US-led international community tarred all armed non-state actors across the world - save those like the Northern Alliance assisting its own military campaign - with the same brush. Repressive regimes the world over leapt at the chance to secure international support against their domestic dissidents. Freedom movements and terrorist organisations alike were proscribed by several governments. The LTTE was banned in Canada and Australia. Sri Lanka's own ban on the LTTE remains a key impediment to negotiations. As the TNA explained, when the government and the LTTE sit down to negotiate they will be representing the Sinhala and Tamil people respectively and as such parity at the table is a requisite for successful negotiations.

New optimism

As 2001 drew to a close, there Tamil community had developed both a sense of optimism - based on a new government that is yet to wage war and has made dovish pre-election noises - and a sense of self-confidence. The disappointments caused by the international community's condemnation of Tamil resistance along with stoic silence in response to Tamil grievances and suffering have produced a more realistic understanding of world realities and the need for more focused effort. That the defeat of the SLA in open battle on the plains of the Jaffna peninsula and the crippling of the SLAF at Katunayake have contributed to Colombo's readiness to revive the Norwegian peace process is quite clear. The bellicose statements by the new Defence Minister and the memories of the violence unleashed by past UNP regimes further tempers any cautious optimism that the conflict is on the wane or that Tamil rights and aspirations will be respected in the near future. But if there is an overarching sentiment the Tamil community enters the New Year with, it is that the struggle for self-determination is progressing despite the hardships faced and the setbacks incurred in 2001 and previous years - and that it is gathering pace.